104.223.97.2
104.223.97.2 is an IP address
that 5 published sources report
in connection with IT Worker Fraud, APT38 and Contagious Interview activity, which public reporting
attributes to North Korea (DPRK).
It is cited here from Google Threat Intelligence Group, Farnsworth Intelligence, Silent Push and Spur.
The earliest of those reports is dated 2024-09-23 and the most recent 2025-02-28.
ip address IT Worker FraudAPT38Contagious Interview MATCHED IN SOURCE
Network
| Kind | Astrill VPN |
|---|---|
| Network | HostPapa |
| Announced by | AS36352 HostPapa |
| Country | United States |
| Flags | hosting range, known proxy or VPN |
Sources
-
…QuadraNet (US) 104.206.40.138 62904 Eonix Corporation AstrillVPN (US) 104.223.97.2 8100 QuadraNet (US) 104.223.98.2 8100 QuadraNet (US)…
Staying a Step Ahead: Mitigating the DPRK IT Worker Threat | Google Cloud Blog — Google Threat Intelligence Group -
…control features in corporate environments as they cannot be easily detected via EDR systems. IoC's: 155.94.255.2 – Rustdesk logs 104.223.97.2 – Rustdesk logs 83.234.227.35 – Rustdesk logs 83.234.227.37 – Rustdesk logs 83.234.227.38 – Rustdesk logs 104.223.98.2 – Rustdesk…
North Korean ITW IoCs and Mitigation Recommendations — Farnsworth Intelligence -
…folder Details from Tayvano’s “BlueNoroff Research” folder also mention Trevor Greer, trevorgreer9312@gmail.com, github.com/trevor9312, 104.223.97.2 (an Astrill VPN IP), and 91.239.130.102 (also Astrill). Infiltrating Lazarus APT Infrastructure Silent Push Threat analysts…
Silent Push Pivots into New Lazarus Group Infrastructure, Acquires Sensitive Intel Related to $1.4B ByBit Hack and Past Attacks — Silent Push -
…from Tayvano’s “BlueNoroff Research” folder also include two Astrill VPN IP addresses that were apparently used in the attack: “104.223.97.2 (an Astrill VPN IP), and 91.239.130.102 (also Astrill).” After our team found this new domain that aligned with previous Lazarus…
Astrill VPN: Silent Push Publicly Releases New IPs on VPN Service Heavily Used by North Korean Threat Actors — Silent Push -
These are the exit addresses of a commercial VPN service with customers everywhere. An address on this list says that a connection came through Astrill, which DPRK IT workers are documented to favour; it does not say who was behind the connection, and the great majority of traffic through these exits is ordinary customers. Treat a match as a reason to look at the account behind it, not as evidence about the person. The list is a snapshot of the addresses active on 19 December 2024; VPN exits are reassigned over time, so an address here may since have been returned to its hosting provider and given to someone else. The list is Spur's and is carried here as published.
Astrill VPN and DPRK Remote Worker Fraud — Spur
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