APT38
Also tracked as BluenoroffBeagleBoyzStardust ChollimaSapphire SleetTraderTraitorNICKEL GLADSTONECOPERNICIUMUNC1069TA444Alluring PiscesCageyChameleonCryptoCore
MITRE ATT&CK G0082
APT38 is Mandiant's name for the part of DPRK financial operations that robs institutions. Against banks in Bangladesh, Vietnam, Poland, Mexico, Chile and elsewhere, operators spend months learning one bank's payment workflow, issue fraudulent transfers inside it, then destroy the systems that would reveal it.
A second line, FASTCash, compromises the card payment switch so intruders approve withdrawals and empty ATMs across many countries within hours. Whether APT38 is a subset of Lazarus or a peer cluster is disputed; Mandiant also hedges that UNC4899 (TraderTraitor) may be former APT38 operators.
- Named individuals
- None profiled on this site yet
- Fabricated personas
- None reconstructed under this tag
- Indicators
- 810 in the searchable index
- Hunts
- 1 in the hunt library
How it differs from the other clusters here
Dwell time is the distinguishing feature: months of reconnaissance precede any theft, which must be executed as a valid transaction.
Understanding the target's business process is the operation; the intrusion is preparation.
It ends loudly, with wiper malware or log destruction against systems that would evidence the transfer, unlike the IT-worker cluster approach of staying unremarkable.
Compare Lazarus GroupKimsukyRGB (Reconnaissance General Bureau)Remote Worker Fraud / Contagious InterviewAndarielAPT37KonniMoonstone SleetPolinRider
What a defender would see
Relevant only to a narrow set of organisations, whose key telemetry is the interbank messaging environment rather than the endpoint estate.
Watch SWIFT-originating workstations, the local Alliance software and database, reconciliation reports and the card payment switch.
The practical signal is a mismatch between systems that should agree, such as a transfer in the network's records but not the bank's own.
Likewise a switch approving withdrawals the core system has no record of, or a reconciliation report that stopped covering an account.
Hunts for this cluster
Indicators
The 810 indicators the index holds under this cluster. The complete index is on Remote Workers.
| Indicator | Type | Persona and cluster | Report date | Sources |
|---|
| Indicator | Type | Persona and cluster | Report date | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
evmrpc-testnet-0g.vercel.app |
hosted site MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 Contagious Interview | 2026-11-11 | 1 |
144.172.74.48 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 3 |
147.124.212.146 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 4 |
147.124.212.89 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 4 |
147.124.213.11 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 3 |
147.124.213.29 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 3 |
147.124.214.129 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 9 |
147.124.214.131 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 5 |
147.124.214.237 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 6 |
172.86.123.35 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 3 |
172.93.201.88 proxy or VPN |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 | 2023-04-20 | 2 |
173.211.106.101 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 3 |
23.152.0.101 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 Contagious Interview | 2021-02-17 | 4 |
4f0d7a33d23d53c0eb8b34d102cdd660fc5323a2 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 | 2017-02-16 | 2 |
67.203.7.171 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 5 |
67.203.7.245 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 3 |
91.92.120.135 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-09-04 | 3 |
95.164.17.24 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Contagious Interview Lazarus Group APT38 | 2024-08-19 | 15 |
185.254.198.90 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
185.66.91.112 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
195.66.213.5 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
213.111.146.132 fixed line |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
213.111.148.202 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
213.111.148.242 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
37ec4665a8102d115ffd1ac20dae94c98b4dac64b0c1a68228aa2a531caeb35d |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
3b87a8b5867c89d2943eeb518436a11c335972ed3f962506025ef4e20bdbfad6 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
45.11.59.140 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 | 2026-09-18 | 2 |
45.11.59.184 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
45.11.59.99 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
7350cb4703a96ea7c140bd30da9a6d1bcff36eb2 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
78.141.211.155 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
7b0e49eb35765d1455b506b9b5e7820d18167760 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
85.137.56.161 fixed line |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
85.137.56.245 fixed line |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 | 2026-09-18 | 2 |
92.242.187.214 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
b4a66cb1a4981970b8a7084e79b3de7f46bb8cb75cc313768b01e0db8450efa9 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
fcd60ed3712f0f2ce8d5a73f550fdf99de485a1d021ad4ba37ca86672fe09d68 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-07 | 1 |
0x8d53903625b8e839b9df4bd28b0efb1cd6b8639a |
wallet address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-10-30 | 2 |
116f7189ed7b41f1b339a749d56e63be |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
176.97.114.232 data centre |
ip address MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 | 2026-09-18 | 2 |
188bd4fc222c9615540884920caf37ea88bcbea7488e1fb98709e357dd096666 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
4402e44c0bc959ac22340041413de2482e8b5d53 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
76ec916464baf025c9573f78fc413f5eab0d03f4ada6cd247671f0f4ab4fbcae |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
8473f85bda00dfa3ecd2385dd38f69600d1d64a6 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
AS6698 |
asn MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
be60c52ca8a01fef7dc15c2f0ebb77d8 |
file hash MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
https://github.com/chainstacker live |
github profile MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 | 2026-09-18 | 2 |
https://github.com/exubient0 live |
github profile MATCHED IN SOURCE | Lazarus Group APT38 | 2026-09-18 | 2 |
https://pastebin.com/raw/3yptBDhL |
payload url MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-11-04 | 1 |
TSpe5HC3PRD2svJcr1YoGszhHk2mtkyZ8A |
wallet address MATCHED IN SOURCE | APT38 | 2026-10-30 | 2 |
Where the evidence comes from
Further reading
Published research on this cluster. None of it is this site’s work.
-
APT38: Un-usual Suspects
The report that separated this cluster from Lazarus in the first place, and still the best account of the operational sequence: reconnaissance, months inside the payment workflow, fraudulent transfer, destruction. A PDF.
-
FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks (AA20-239A)
The government account of the ATM cash-out scheme, and the place to read about the payment-switch compromise specifically. Marked as archived content, but it remains the reference description of how switch responses are forged.
-
TraderTraitor: North Korean State-Sponsored APT Targets Blockchain Companies (AA22-108A)
Where the same financial mission went once banks hardened: cryptocurrency exchanges and blockchain firms, reached by social-engineering their employees rather than through the interbank network.
-
Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe
The U.S. charging account of the Bangladesh Bank theft and the attempts that followed it, useful as the prosecution's version of the story the vendor reporting tells.
-
TA444: APT Startup Aimed at Acquisition (of Your Funds)
Proofpoint's own designation for this cluster, stated to overlap with APT38, BlueNoroff, Stardust Chollima and COPERNICIUM. Good on the phishing and credential-theft side of the operation rather than the SWIFT-fraud side.
-
Dissecting Sapphire Sleet's macOS intrusion from lure to compromise
Microsoft's current reporting on the name it now uses for this cluster, including the fake-recruiter and fake-investor lures aimed at individual cryptocurrency holders rather than institutions.
-
How Microsoft names threat actors
The source for the Sapphire Sleet alias table used above: COPERNICIUM, UNC1069, Stardust Chollima, Alluring Pisces, BlueNoroff, CageyChameleon and CryptoCore, listed together as one name's other names.
-
Assessed Cyber Structure and Alignments of North Korea in 2023
The source for Mandiant's hedged UNC1069/UNC4899 language quoted above, and the clearest published account of how these financially-motivated clusters relate to APT38 without being asserted as identical to it.