155.94.255.2
155.94.255.2 is an IP address
that 5 published sources report
in connection with IT Worker Fraud, Contagious Interview and APT38 activity, which public reporting
attributes to North Korea (DPRK).
It is cited here from Google Threat Intelligence Group, Farnsworth Intelligence, Silent Push and Spur.
The earliest of those reports is dated 2024-09-23 and the most recent 2025-04-24.
ip address IT Worker FraudContagious InterviewAPT38 MATCHED IN SOURCE
Network
| Kind | Astrill VPN |
|---|---|
| Network | HostPapa |
| Announced by | AS36352 HostPapa |
| Country | United States |
| Flags | hosting range, known proxy or VPN |
Sources
-
…56167 Ufone (PK) 123.190.56.214 4837 China Unicom (CN) 155.94.255.2 8100 QuadraNet (US) 174.128.251.99 46844 Sharktech AstrillVPN (US)…
Staying a Step Ahead: Mitigating the DPRK IT Worker Threat | Google Cloud Blog — Google Threat Intelligence Group -
…stripped of their remote desktop control features in corporate environments as they cannot be easily detected via EDR systems. IoC's: 155.94.255.2 – Rustdesk logs 104.223.97.2 – Rustdesk logs 83.234.227.35 – Rustdesk logs 83.234.227.37 – Rustdesk logs 83.234.227.38 – Rustdesk…
North Korean ITW IoCs and Mitigation Recommendations — Farnsworth Intelligence -
…discovered the following Astrill VPN IPs – Astrill VPN being the well-documented “VPN of choice” for many North Korean threat actors: 155.94.255.2 174.128.251.99 194.33.45.162 198.255.45.131 199.115.99.34 204.188.233.66 208.115.228.234 209.127.117.234 23.106.161.1 23.106.169.1…
Silent Push uncovered Contagious Interview front company scam — Silent Push -
…Astrill VPN IPs included in Lazarus Group infrastructure logs include: 104.223.97.2 104.223.98.2 107.172.242.4 107.174.131.204 155.94.255.2 189.1.170.50 194.33.45.162 198.23.241.254 199.115.99.34 204.188.233.66 208.115.228.234 209.127.117.234 23.106.161.1 23.106.169.120…
Silent Push Pivots into New Lazarus Group Infrastructure, Acquires Sensitive Intel Related to $1.4B ByBit Hack and Past Attacks — Silent Push -
These are the exit addresses of a commercial VPN service with customers everywhere. An address on this list says that a connection came through Astrill, which DPRK IT workers are documented to favour; it does not say who was behind the connection, and the great majority of traffic through these exits is ordinary customers. Treat a match as a reason to look at the account behind it, not as evidence about the person. The list is a snapshot of the addresses active on 19 December 2024; VPN exits are reassigned over time, so an address here may since have been returned to its hosting provider and given to someone else. The list is Spur's and is carried here as published.
Astrill VPN and DPRK Remote Worker Fraud — Spur
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Cited by the same report: North Korean ITW IoCs and Mitigation Recommendations
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