91.239.130.102

91.239.130.102 is an IP address that 8 published sources report in connection with IT Worker Fraud, Contagious Interview, Lazarus Group and APT38 activity, which public reporting attributes to North Korea (DPRK). It is cited here from Sekoia.io Threat Detection & Research / Kudelski Security, Kudelski Security Research, Silent Push, Kudelski Security, Recorded Future and Spur. The earliest of those reports is dated 2024-12-19 and the most recent 2026-10-18.

ip address IT Worker FraudContagious InterviewLazarus GroupAPT38 MATCHED IN SOURCE

First seen 2024-12-19 · last seen 2026-10-18

Network

KindAstrill VPN exit address
NetworkClouvider Limited (Clouvider HB)
Announced byAS62240 Clouvider
CountryGermany
Flagshosting range, known proxy or VPN

Looked up 2026-09-21 at ip-api.com. This address is on Spur’s list of Astrill VPN exits. It names the VPN, not the user.

Sources

  • …Campaign and cluster source Source 23.237.102.130 37.120.154.98 38.75.137.97 45.86.208.162 50.7.159.34 91.239.130.102 103.214.44.138 167.88.61.117 185.135.76.89 188.43.33.252 211.21.6.181 Contagious Interview (Recorded Future)…
    Beyond Lazarus: How North Korea Organizes Its Cyber Operations — Sekoia.io Threat Detection & Research / Kudelski Security · under “Annex 2 - Overlap between fake IT workers and DPRK offensive campaigns” · published 2026-09-07 · pulled 2026-09-09
  • …+ Source of the cluster Source 23.237.102.130 37.120.154.98 38.75.137.97 45.86.208.162 50.7.159.34 91.239.130.102 103.214.44.138 167.88.61.117 185.135.76.89 188.43.33.252 211.211.6.181 Contagious Interview (Recorded future)…
    Kudelski Security Research — Kudelski Security Research · under “Annexes” · published 2025-03-05 · pulled 2026-09-10
  • …06.161.1 23.106.169.120 38.170.181.10 38.32.68.195 45.86.208.162 66.118.255.35 70.32.3.15 70.39.103.3 70.39.70.194 77.247.126.189 91.239.130.102 Investigating BlockNovas’ GitHub Infrastructure Here, our team began searching for any GitHub content associated with “Blocknovas.”…
    Silent Push uncovered Contagious Interview front company scam — Silent Push · under “Investigating the C2 Domain “camdriversupport.com”” · published 2025-04-24 · pulled 2026-09-12
  • …Polaris Team 104.253.201.228 Polaris Team 162.253.129.2 MyoHyangGyongSong team 91.239.130.102 Team 128-710 83.234.227.10 Team 821-39 Relevant Antivirus Solutions to Note Antivirus…
    DPRK Fake IT Workers: Inside Their Evolving Network Infrastructure - Kudelski Security Research Center — Kudelski Security · under “IOC’s” · published 2026-07-17 · pulled 2026-09-12
  • …Research” folder also mention Trevor Greer, trevorgreer9312@gmail.com, github.com/trevor9312, 104.223.97.2 (an Astrill VPN IP), and 91.239.130.102 (also Astrill). Infiltrating Lazarus APT Infrastructure Silent Push Threat analysts successfully infiltrated the Lazarus infrastructure…
    Silent Push Pivots into New Lazarus Group Infrastructure, Acquires Sensitive Intel Related to $1.4B ByBit Hack and Past Attacks — Silent Push · under “Bybit-assessment.com Pivot Leads to “Trevor Greer” Connection Seen in Past Lazarus Attacks” · published 2025-02-25 · pulled 2026-09-12
  • …84.17.41.94 85.195.72.66 85.195.119.90 89.163.154.155 89.187.161.180 89.187.161.220 89.187.185.11 91.207.174.99 91.207.206.10 91.221.66.87 91.239.130.102 94.46.23.20 95.143.193.150 95.216.14.148 103.6.219.221 103.16.228.16 103.50.33.16 103.111.113.26 103.125.234.62 103.125.234.107 103.125.234…
    PurpleBravo’s Targeting of the IT Software Supply Chain — Recorded Future · under “Appendix C: Astrill VPN Nodes” · published 2026-01-21 · pulled 2026-09-12
  • …Research” folder also include two Astrill VPN IP addresses that were apparently used in the attack: “104.223.97.2 (an Astrill VPN IP), and 91.239.130.102 (also Astrill).” After our team found this new domain that aligned with previous Lazarus research, we were able to make additional pivots…
    Astrill VPN: Silent Push Publicly Releases New IPs on VPN Service Heavily Used by North Korean Threat Actors — Silent Push · under “Test Logs Confirm Lazarus Subgroup “Contagious Interview” Still Using Astrill VPN IPs” · published 2025-02-28 · pulled 2026-09-12
  • These are the exit addresses of a commercial VPN service with customers everywhere. An address on this list says that a connection came through Astrill, which DPRK IT workers are documented to favour; it does not say who was behind the connection, and the great majority of traffic through these exits is ordinary customers. Treat a match as a reason to look at the account behind it, not as evidence about the person. The list is a snapshot of the addresses active on 19 December 2024; VPN exits are reassigned over time, so an address here may since have been returned to its hosting provider and given to someone else. The list is Spur's and is carried here as published.
    Astrill VPN and DPRK Remote Worker Fraud — Spur · published 2024-12-19 · pulled 2026-10-26

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Related indicators

Cited by the same report: Beyond Lazarus: How North Korea Organizes Its Cyber Operations

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Cited by the same report: Silent Push uncovered Contagious Interview front company scam

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Disclaimer An entry here is not proof of DPRK affiliation or wrongdoing. A listed name, account or address may belong to an uninvolved person, so each entry is a lead to verify independently. What inclusion means. See the sourcing methodology.