TLmj13VL4p6NQ7jpxz8d9uYY6FUKCYatSe
TLmj13VL4p6NQ7jpxz8d9uYY6FUKCYatSe is a cryptocurrency wallet address
that 2 published sources report
in connection with EtherHiding / UNC5342 and Contagious Interview activity, which public reporting
attributes to North Korea (DPRK).
It is cited here from Ransom-ISAC.
The earliest of those reports is dated 2025-10-27 and the most recent 2025-12-08.
On-chain links
| C2 host | Transaction | Verdict | Network | Provider | Country | Registered | First written | Last written |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
136.0.9.8 |
Malicious | data centre | Ace Data Centers II | United Kingdom | ||||
166.88.4.2 |
Malicious | data centre | Ace Data Centers II | United Kingdom | ||||
23.27.20.143 |
Malicious | data centre | Ace Data Centers II | United Kingdom | ||||
23.27.202.27 |
Malicious | data centre | Ace Data Centers II | United States |
wallet address EtherHiding / UNC5342Contagious Interview CURATED
Sources
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TRON: TLmj13VL4p6NQ7jpxz8d9uYY6FUKCYatSe → extracts transaction data, reverses it
TRON address the malware queries for its most recent outbound transaction. Payload1_1 index in part 2, and the pointer address Ransom-ISAC's part 4 found carrying the most pointers to BSC transactions. The transaction's raw_data.data field holds a hex-encoded, reversed BSC transaction hash, which the malware then fetches from a BSC RPC node and decrypts as its next stage; an Aptos account is queried as a fallback. The address does not hold the payload and rotating the pointer is a single transaction. Ransom-ISAC, which calls the technique Cross-Chain TxDataHiding (XCTDH), says the targeting and operational priorities strongly suggest a DPRK-affiliated actor, and its part 4, written with Crystal Intelligence, reports funding traced to addresses involved in other DPRK thefts. The first part of the series rests on infrastructure and targeting rather than on a named cluster, so this entry carries the Contagious Interview label and no UNC cluster.
Cross-Chain TxDataHiding Crypto Heist: A Very Chainful Process (Part 2) — Ransom-ISAC -
Both addresses were funded by a common source for fees, TQdwohPCWqqfCUaCispyV1NaUZ1HgiJPUy . Examination of this fee paying address identified a third address, TLmj13VL4p6NQ7jpxz8d9uYY6FUKCYatSe that also contained a significant number of pointers to transactions on BSC. A review of all these transactions identified 52 pointers on other chains (See IoCs)
TRON address the malware queries for its most recent outbound transaction. Payload1_1 index in part 2, and the pointer address Ransom-ISAC's part 4 found carrying the most pointers to BSC transactions. The transaction's raw_data.data field holds a hex-encoded, reversed BSC transaction hash, which the malware then fetches from a BSC RPC node and decrypts as its next stage; an Aptos account is queried as a fallback. The address does not hold the payload and rotating the pointer is a single transaction. Ransom-ISAC, which calls the technique Cross-Chain TxDataHiding (XCTDH), says the targeting and operational priorities strongly suggest a DPRK-affiliated actor, and its part 4, written with Crystal Intelligence, reports funding traced to addresses involved in other DPRK thefts. The first part of the series rests on infrastructure and targeting rather than on a named cluster, so this entry carries the Contagious Interview label and no UNC cluster.
Cross-Chain TxDataHiding Crypto Heist: A Very (Very) Chainful Process (Part 4) — Ransom-ISAC
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Related indicators
Cited by the same report: Cross-Chain TxDataHiding Crypto Heist: A Very Chainful Process (Part 2)
All 19 indicators from this source