0xc12c8d8f9706244eca0acf04e880f10ff4e52522
0xc12c8d8f9706244eca0acf04e880f10ff4e52522 is a smart contract address
that 2 published sources report
in connection with EtherHiding / UNC5342 and unclustered DPRK activity, which public reporting
attributes to North Korea (DPRK).
It is cited here from Atos Threat Research Center.
The reports are dated 2026-04-14.
On-chain links
| C2 host | Transaction | Verdict | Network | Provider | Country | Registered | First written | Last written |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
microsoft.com |
Etherscan | parked | 1991-05-02 | 2026-04-14 | 2026-04-14 | |||
imported-spread-amplifier-chemicals.trycloudflare.com |
Etherscan | Malicious | 2026-04-02 | 2026-04-02 | ||||
terminal-labels-fan-witness.trycloudflare.com |
Etherscan | Malicious | 2026-04-02 | 2026-04-02 | ||||
millersteel.digital |
Etherscan | Malicious | 2026-03-31 | 2026-04-01 | 2026-04-02 | |||
5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
Etherscan | parked | 2026-03-31 | 2026-04-03 | ||||
a9 |
Etherscan | placeholder | 2026-03-31 | 2026-03-31 | ||||
cerumo.shop |
Etherscan | Malicious | 2026-03-31 | 2026-03-31 | 2026-03-31 | |||
fluxnet.life |
Etherscan | Malicious | 2026-03-31 | 2026-03-31 | 2026-03-31 | |||
luminer.work |
Etherscan | Malicious | 2026-03-30 | 2026-03-31 | 2026-03-31 |
Write transactions
Download these results
| Date | Transaction | Sender | Value written |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-14 | 0xbae72bf3687d… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://microsoft.com |
| 2026-04-03 | 0xfb9f2e9bf18c… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-04-02 | 0x668dcb01d99c… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://imported-spread-amplifier-chemicals.trycloudflare.com |
| 2026-04-02 | 0x731bce8245b0… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://terminal-labels-fan-witness.trycloudflare.com |
| 2026-04-02 | 0x29f143badc02… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://millersteel.digital |
| 2026-04-02 | 0xe6c14a524f14… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-04-01 | 0x842d6a6816e2… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://millersteel.digital |
| 2026-04-01 | 0x8461ccc62308… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-03-31 | 0x5d369af7009b… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://cerumo.shop |
| 2026-03-31 | 0xe38a19529ea3… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-03-31 | 0x9fad2dcd16d0… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
A9/ https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-03-31 | 0x97599b09689a… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://cerumo.shop |
| 2026-03-31 | 0xbb94281fda51… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-03-31 | 0xe9b3477ba364… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://fluxnet.life |
| 2026-03-31 | 0xb76e7f0a3822… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-03-31 | 0x4d9876e7af42… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://fluxnet.life |
| 2026-03-31 | 0x159595cf6b84… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-03-31 | 0xcaa9be59c7bb… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://fluxnet.life |
| 2026-03-31 | 0xa638e9e45006… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://luminer.work |
| 2026-03-31 | 0x3fe13097acaf… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
| 2026-03-31 | 0x6b58d76cb55f… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://luminer.work |
| 2026-03-31 | 0xee983dfc1856… |
0x37ef6e884256… |
https://5ppljcs.microsoft.com |
smart contract address EtherHiding / UNC5342DPRK (cluster unattributed) CURATED
Listed as Ethereum
Sources
-
0xc12c8d8f9706244eca0acf04e880f10ff4e52522
Ethereum contract that EtherRAT reads to find its command-and-control server, listed in Atos's appendix as created 2026-03-31 with 21 setString calls when the appendix was compiled. It stores a mapping from operator wallet to URL: the operator writes the C2 with setString(string) and the implant reads it with getString(address) (selector 0x7d434425). On 2026-10-03 getString(0x37ef6e88425613564b2cf8adc496acff4b6481a9) against a public Ethereum node returned a URL, confirming the contract has this shape; the stored values are not recorded here because operators park the resolver on well-known domains between sessions. Atos names no actor of its own: it repeats Sysdig's link between EtherRAT and the DPRK Contagious Interview tooling and notes code overlap with a tool eSentire attributed to an Iranian group, so this entry is filed under the unattributed DPRK label.
EtherRAT-appendixes (IoCs/wallets_and_contracts.csv) — Atos Threat Research Center -
For the purpose of this explanation, we used one of the contracts used by attackers ( 0xc12c8d8f9706244eca0acf04e880f10ff4e52522) and wallet that funded it ( 0x37ef6e88425613564b2cf8adc496acff4b6481a9).
Ethereum contract that EtherRAT reads to find its command-and-control server, listed in Atos's appendix as created 2026-03-31 with 21 setString calls when the appendix was compiled. It stores a mapping from operator wallet to URL: the operator writes the C2 with setString(string) and the implant reads it with getString(address) (selector 0x7d434425). On 2026-10-03 getString(0x37ef6e88425613564b2cf8adc496acff4b6481a9) against a public Ethereum node returned a URL, confirming the contract has this shape; the stored values are not recorded here because operators park the resolver on well-known domains between sessions. Atos names no actor of its own: it repeats Sysdig's link between EtherRAT and the DPRK Contagious Interview tooling and notes code overlap with a tool eSentire attributed to an Iranian group, so this entry is filed under the unattributed DPRK label.
EtherRAT distribution: spoofing administrative tools via GitHub facades — Atos Threat Research Center -
…against takedown and blocklisting efforts. For the purpose of this explanation, we used one of the contracts used by attackers ( 0xc12c8d8f9706244eca0acf04e880f10ff4e52522) and wallet that funded it ( 0x37ef6e88425613564b2cf8adc496acff4b6481a9).…
EtherRAT distribution spoofing administrative tools via GitHub facades — Atos Threat Research Center
Find this indicator in the index, or see every smart contract address this site holds under Smart contract addresses in the browse listing.
Related indicators
Cited by the same report: EtherRAT-appendixes (IoCs/wallets_and_contracts.csv)
All 97 indicators from this source